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STATE TAXING POWER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - STATE TAXATION OF
INTERSTATE COMMERCE - OUT-OF-STATE RETAILER
AS COLLECTOR OF USE TAX
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue,
386 U.S. 753 (1967).
An increasing problem today concerns the taxation of commer-
cial enterprises that do not confine their activities to a single State.
This problem can best be described in terms of the conflicting and
competing State and federal interests involving fiscal and commer-
cial matters. State tax administrators, in failing to keep pace with
State expenditures, have constantly been seeking new sources of
revenue.1 Yet, it is of vital importance that the commerce and
trade of the country not be fettered by State taxes that prevent an
expanding and prosperous economy. The United States Supreme
Court recently dealt with this conflict in National Bellas Hess, Inc.
v. Department of Revenue.2
The appellant, Bellas Hess, was a large retail establishment in-
corporated in Delaware. It operated a national retail mail-order
business with headquarters in North Kansas City, Missouri. Twice
each year, appellant mailed catalogues from its Missouri location to
over 5 million customers residing throughout the United States, in
addition to sending out intermediate sales books and merchandise
flyers. All orders were received in Missouri.
Although appellant had no other contact with Illinois,' the ap-
pellee, Illinois Department of Revenue, obtained a judgment from
the Illinois Supreme Court4 ordering Bellas Hess to collect and pay
I See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DBP'T OF COMMERCE, COMPENDIUM
OF STATE GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1964, at 1, 6 (1965); U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORIcAL STATIsIcS OF STATE AND 1.0-
CAL FINANCES 1902-1953, at 1 (1955).
2386 U.S. 753 (1967).
3 The Illinois Supreme Court, although it held against Bellas Hess, did note that:
[Appellant] does not maintain in Illinois any office, distribution house, sales
house, warehouse or any other place of business; it does not have in Illinois
any agent, salesman, canvasser, solicitor or other type of representative to sell
or take orders, to deliver merchandise, to accept payments, or to service mer-
chandise it sells; it does not own any tangible property, real or personal, in
Illinois; it has no telephone listing in Illinois and it has not advertised its mer-
chandise for sale in newspapers, on billboards, or by radio or television in
Illinois. Department of Revenue v. National Bellas Hess, Inc., 34 III. 2d 164,
166-67,214 N.E.2d 755, 757 (1966), revd, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
4 34 Ill. 2d 164, 214 N..2d 755 (1966).
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to Illinois the use taxes imposed by the Illinois Use Tax Act.' On
appeal the United States Supreme Court was confronted with two
closely related, yet distinguishable, questions: (1) whether the Illi-
nois statute constituted a violation of the 14th amendment due proc-
ess clause;6 (2) whether the Illinois statute constituted a violation of
the commerce clause.7 In reversing the Illinois Supreme Court, the
Court in Bellas Hess held that it was unconstitutional to impose a
duty on appellant to collect the use tax set forth in the Illinois Use
Tax Act.
An essential element in determining whether a State tax im-
posed on an out-of-State retailer violates the due process clause is
the degree and extent of contact between the taxing State and the
taxpayer. The Constitution requires a nexus, "some definite link,
some minimum connection, between a state and the person, prop-
erty or transaction it seeks to tax."' The majority in Bellas Hess
essentially reaffirmed the Court's previous position concerning the
definition of this required nexus.
In applying the nexus principle, the Court's decisions prior to
Bellas Hess seemed to distinguish out-of-State corporations which
had outlets or property,' and salesmen or representatives"0 within
the taxing State from those firms which were exclusively out-of-
State and whose only contact with the taxing jurisdiction was by
mail, common carrier, local newspaper, radio, television, or maga-
5 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, 5 439.1 (Supp. 1966). The statute provides that the use
tax shall be collected from the purchaser by any retailer "maintaining a place of busi-
ness in this State," and makes the obligation a debt of the retailer regardless of whether
the tax is actually collected. Id. § 439.3.
The statute defines "maintaining a place of business" as "[e]ngaging in soliciting
orders within this State from users by means of catalogues or other advertising, whether
such orders are received or accepted within or without this State." id. § 439.2.2.
G U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
71d. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
8 Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954). See also American Oil
Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451 (1965); Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 210-11 (1960).
0 Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941). The case involved a mail-
order firm which maintained retail outlets in the taxing State. The Court, in upholding
the State use tax, emphasized the importance of the seller's local retail outlets and the
protection these outlets received from the taxing State. Id. at 364; see Nelson v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941).
10 Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960). The out-of-State seller sent "10
wholesalers, jobbers, or 'salesmen' conducting continuous local solicitation" into the
taxing State. Id. at 211. The Court held that the requisite nexus between the retailer
and the taxing State was present, and thus the State had fulfilled the jurisdictional re-
quirements. See General Trading Co. v. State Taxing Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944);
Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939).
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zine advertisement." The corporations which were in the former
category were susceptible to local use taxation; the corporations in
the latter class were not susceptible to use taxation. This classifica-
tion remains as a result of Bellas Hess.
The dissent in Bellas Hess attacked the artificial and mechanical
approach taken by the majority in applying the nexus principle.
Mr. Justice Fortas, speaking for the dissent, suggested that the
search for constitutionally sufficient contacts look toward total busi-
ness activities, in this case appellant's "systematic, continuous solici-
tation and exploitation of the Illinois consumer market."'" After
stating this proposition, the dissent concluded that appellant's ac-
tivities did satisfy the minimum contact requirements of the due
process clause, and thus the tax was constitutional.
Mr. Justice Fortas' rationale for such a holding arose from the
conclusion that appellant enjoyed the benefits of, and the profits
from, the facilities established and "nurtured" by the State of Illi-
nois."5 The benefits afforded Bellas Hess by Illinois included the
ability to utilize credit facilities, to make sales, and to realize a profit.
In exchange for these "benefits" the dissent stated that Illinois was
entitled to ask for compensation through an assessment of a local
use tax.'4
In reality, however, there is a great deal of exaggeration con-
cerning the extent of these benefits conferred by Illinois upon ap-
pellant.'5 In fact, the benefits in most similar circumstances are
11 Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954) which held that it was unconsti-
tutional for Maryland to impose a use tax upon a Delaware seller who had no retail out-
lets or sales solicitors in Maryland. The seller in Miller Bros., unlike the appellant in
Bellas Hess, advertised its wares in newspapers and on television and made household
deliveries. To that extent Miller Bros. is not controlling on Bellas Hess. However, the
relevance of Miller Bros. to the majority's reasoning in Bellas Hess is that the Court in
Miller Bros. refused to recognize a nexus where the seller did not send any agents into
the taxing State, regardless of the fact that the seller was involved both in the solicitation
of orders by interstate dissemination of general advertising, and in making of household
deliveries to local customers.
12 386 U.S. at 762 (dissenting opinion).
13 Id
14Id, at 765-66.
15 The "benefits" extended to Bellas Hess did not arise from any activities conducted
within Illinois. Appellant had no property, no representatives, or salesmen in Illinois.
to enjoy the benefits of the State. The exploitation referred to by the dissent consisted
mainly of activities outside of the State: (1) The posting of catalogues in the United
States mails in Missouri; (2) the receiving of money and orders from purchasers in Illi-
nois; (3) delivering to the United States mails and common carriers in Missouri prod-
ucts addressed to the Illinois consumers. Brief for Appellant at 34, National Bellas Hess,
Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
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indirect at best.16 And, of course, the Court has construed the Con-
stitution as prohibiting discrimination against interstate commerce
in favor of local business.' Using a "benefit and protection" ap-
proach, the majority decided that the benefits were not of such a
nature to warrant Illinois' imposition of a tax upon appellant in re-
turn for such benefits and thus held that the due process clause was
violated by the tax assessment.
Of the two approaches to the due process issue and the nexus
criterion, however, the position advocated by Mr. Justice Fortas ap-
pears more formidable and realistic. Regardless of where distinc-
tions are made and how sharply they are drawn, it may be assumed
that situations will arise which will demand a further "splitting of
hairs" until the original distinctions become meaningless.
One of the greatest difficulties confronting the Court in Bellas
Hess was the distinction between the "due process clause" and the
"commerce clause." The Supreme Court had recognized this prob-
lem previously when Mr. Justice Rutledge admitted:
If there is a want of due process to sustain the tax, by that fact
alone any burden the tax imposes on the commerce among the
states becomes "undue." But, though overlapping, the two con-
ceptions are not identical. There may be more than sufficient
factual connections, with economic and legal effects, between the
transaction and the taxing state to sustain the tax as against due
process objections. Yet [the tax] may fall because of its burden-
ing effect upon the commerce.'8
The strength and validity of the Bellas Hess decision clearly lies
in the second issue - the possible violation of the commerce clause;
for inherent in the commerce clause question are the policies that
favor the mail-order houses which deal exclusively in interstate com-
merce.
There is little doubt that the majority in Bellas Hess realized
16 A State does not maintain its markets for the benefit of out-of-State vendors, but
rather for the State's own consumers and producers. Perhaps a State tolerates out-of-
State sellers because its consumers are interested in out-of-State products. Some prod-
ucts are readily available in certain States, and yet relatively scarce in others. Studenski,
The Need for Federal Curbs on State Taxes on Interstate Commerce - An Economist's
Viewpoint, 46 VA. L. REV. 1121, 1130-31 (1960).
17 Regardless of the reasons why a State tolerates out-of-State sellers, the motivation
which stimulates State governments to furnish protective services to out-of-State corpo-
rations which trade in their State is "indirect and half-hearted when compared with the
-very direct and full-hearted motivation which inspires them to furnish services to their
own producers." Id. Furthermore, the benefits and services accruing to the out-of-
.State vendors are but a small portion of those furnished to the in-State vendors.
18 International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 353 (1944)
<concurring opinion).
STATE TAXING POWER
the imminent -threat to mail-order houses and to interstate commerce
as a whole, if the Illinois Use Tax Act were upheld. Two distinct
burdens could result from the imposition of a local use tax on an
out-of-State corporation.
One such burden arises from the possibility that a corporation
could be taxed twice for the same transaction. 9 The second bur-
den, which is more pertinent to Bellas Hess, is referred to as the
"burden of compliance." This burden operates on the many cor-
porations which are faced with the problems of State taxation of
their interstate activities and transactions.
In 1958 Congress, realizing the gravity of these burdens, en-
acted legislation which authorized extensive studies of the matter.2"
19 Commonly called the "multiple burdens doctrine," this doctrine was first enun-
dated by Mr. Justice Stone. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250
(1938). See generally Barrett, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce - "Direct Bur-
dens," "Multiple Burdens," or What Have You?, 4 VAND. L. REV. 496, 506-15 (1951).
Under this doctrine a corporation in State A which sells to a purchaser in State B could
conceivably be taxed for the sale in State A and also be liable for the collection of a use
tax in State B. In effect this would discriminate against interstate commerce in that a
local retailer whose sole business is in State B would only be assessed one tax, thus giv-
ing him a competitive advantage over the seller incorporated in State A. See Michigan-
Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954); Memphis Steam Laundry
Cleaner v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952).
The dissent in Bel/as Hess is strengthened by the fact that the Use Tax Act, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 4 39.3(c) (Supp. 1966), was expressly intended to prevent dupli-
cate taxation. Pursuant to the statute an out-of-State seller is exempt from the use tax
in Illinois to the extent such seller pays a similar tax on the same transaction in its home
State. Id. Consequently, multiple taxation is avoided to a large extent. Furthermore,
the possibility of multiple burdens has generally been alleviated since most States have
adopted a more or less uniform regulation or administrative practice recommended by
the National Association of Tax Administrators. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
TAX ADMINISTRATORs, REPORT No. 10, PRoPosED UNIFOR!m REGULATION FOR
TAXATIoN OF INTERSTATE TRANSACTIONS UNDER STATE SALES TAx LAWs (1940).
This practice exempts out-of-State corporations from a sales tax on a transaction pursu-
ant to a contract requiring shipment out of State. Such a transaction is thus left subject
to a use tax by only the buyer's State and thus duplication of taxes is avoided. The tax-
ing procedures are administrative and not statutory, and are thus subject to change.
Moreover the Supreme Court use tax decisions do not preclude the possibility of a mul-
tiple burden where a sales tax is imposed by the seller's State and a use tax is imposed by
the buyer's State. The potential of a multiple burden cannot be dismissed until Con-
gress or the Court clearly sets forth which State - seller's or buyer's - may impose the
tax and under what circumstances. Kust and Sak, State Taxation of Interstate Sales, 46
VA. L REV. 1290, 1302 (1940).
20 The studies concerned the increasing expansion of State taxation of interstate
business. Subsequent to the decision in Northwest Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota.,
358 U.S. 450 (1959), Congress enacted legislation that (among other things) authorized
the House Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate Committee on Finance to make a
complete study of State taxation on income derived from interstate business activities.
Act of September 14, 1959, 73 Star. 556. After Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207
(1960), the authorization was extended to include studies on sales and use taxes. Act
of April 7, 1961, 75 Star. 41. The hearings commenced during the 87th Congress and
have continued through the present Congress. Reports were also published. Recent
hearings most relevant to Bellas Hess are the Hearings on H.R. 11,798 and Companion
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The problem arose from the general lack of uniformity among the
various State tax laws and recording procedures. Great difficulty
confronts an out-of-State vendor in determining whether or not a
particular statute of a State in which he is making a sale does or
does not require him to collect the use tax.2 Furthermore, the out-
of-State vendor may be unaware of the facts upon which the appli-
cability of a use tax depends. The in-State purchaser usually does
know these facts, especially in regard to the mail-order business.
Smaller mail-order houses do not keep records of sales by States and
the added expense of requiring them to do so would, in itself, im-
pose a hardship upon them.22
The possibility of a competitive advantage accruing to the out-
of-State seller is the price that must be paid to insure a free flow of
interstate commerce. Furthermore, the out-of-State seller many
times is not in competition with in-State corporations.23 In these sit-
uations the competitive advantage of a mail-order seller is a myth.2"
Actually, many mail-order houses do not compete with local sell-
ers.
2 5
The conclusion to be drawn from Congressional hearings is that
some of the large mail-order houses - and they comprise a small
minority - would be able to cope with the various State taxes im-
Bills Before the Special Subcomm. on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., set. 14 (1966).
21 Hearings on H.R. 11,798, supra note 20, at 219. Mr. Harold Halfpenny eluci-
dated this grave difficulty in his testimony before the 1966 House of Representatives
Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce. He pointed out in
1962 that 35 States and the District of Columbia required compensating use taxes by
out-of-State sellers, and among these 35 States, five separate standards were used in
levying their respective use taxes:
Five States required collection for "maintaining a place of business" in the
State; 5 used "agent operating" in the State as the test, and 12 added "agent
operating temporarily"; three more used "solicitation" by "agent" as a stand-
ard. The fifth and most drastic standard required collection of the use tax by
out-of-state sellers who distribute catalogs or other advertising matter within
the State, and have no other connection with it. Id.
22 1d. at 224.
23 Testimony of James R. Utley, vice president of a Detroit company which sells by
mail order. Id. at 510-11.
24 James A. Alter of Chicago:
The local wholesaler has the advantage of proximity, speed, friendship - and
many other factors - that give him a competitive advantage. We are able
to do business in these other States only because we carry a very large inven-
tory of many esoteric items, and when a customer in a distant State needs some-
thing he can't order locally, he orders it from us. He certainly doesn't order
from us something he can get locally. Id. at 1445.
25 Stephen F. Harris testified on behalf of the New England Mail Order Association
that practically every mail-order business aside from the giants is based on the unusual
products that have not reached local stores. Id. at 1321-22.
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posed on interstate commerce. The remaining mail-order houses
would find it practically impossible to comply with the burdens im-
posed by the ,taxing authorities of the States. The expense involved
in familiarizing themselves with the technicalities of divergent tax
laws would discourage these firms from entering many States. They
would be compelled to hire lawyers and accountants to prepare and
file various tax returns and to negotiate with tax administrators.2"
A remaining problem not resolved by the dissent is the defini-
tion of large-scale business. Unless the Court imposes a standard,
it will have to decide the issue on a case-by-case basis. And unless
the burdening effect is obviated, its imposition will be proportion-
ately greater on the smaller firms.27
Congress has recently taken steps toward alleviating some of
the confusion through the pending Interstate Taxation Act.2" The
bill sets forth a uniform jurisdictional standard which prohibits a
State or political subdivision from requiring a person to collect a
sales or use tax unless that person has a business location in the
State," or regularly makes household deliveries.30  One of the pur-
2 6 Studenski, supra note 16, at 1138-39. Mr. Justice Frankfurter recognized this
difficulty in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 470
(1958) (dissenting opinion), when he stated that the "small or moderate-sized" firms
doing exclusively interstate business would be forced to keep books, make records, and
file returns in order to comply with State taxing authorities; this cost of compliance
would, in many instances, exceed the burden of the tax itself.
27 Sparkman, The Problems of Multistate Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 46
A.B.A.J. 375, 377 (1960).
2 8 H.R. 2158, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
2 9 Id. § 10 1(2). The act defines "business location."
A person shall be considered to have a business location within a State only if
that person - (1) owns or leases real property within the State, (2) has one
or more employees located in the State, or (3) regularly maintains a stock of
tangible personal property in the State for sale in the ordinary course of its
business.
(c) If a person does not own or lease real property within any State or have an
employee located in any State or regularly maintain a stock of tangible per-
sonal property in any State for sale in the ordinary course of business... that
person shall be considered to have a business location only - (1) in the State
in which the principal place from which its trade or business is conducted is
located, or (2) if the principal place from which its trade or business is con-
ducted is not located in any State, in the State of its legal domicile. Id. § 511.
30 Id. § 514: Household Deliveries: "A seller makes household deliveries ... if he
delivers goods, otherwise than by mail or by a common carrier, to the dwelling places of
his purchasers .... " Id. (emphasis added). See also id. § 301 which states in part that:
(a) A State or political subdivision thereof may impose a sales tax or require
a seller to collect a sales or use tax with respect to an interstate sale of tangible
personal property only if the destination of the sale is - (1) in that State, or
(2) in a State or political subdivision for which the tax is required to be col-
lected.
(b) A State or political subdivision thereof may not impose a use tax with
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